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ABSTRACT
The ongoing pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019-2020 (COVID-19) is caused by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). This pathogenic virus is able to spread asymptotically during its incubation stage through a
vulnerable population. Given the state of healthcare, policymakers were urged to contain the spread of infection, minimize
stress on the health systems and ensure public safety. Most effective tool that was at their disposal was to close non-essential
business and issue a stay home order. In this paper we consider techniques to measure the effectiveness of stringency
measures adopted by governments across the world. Analyzing effectiveness of control measures like lock-down allows us
to understand whether the decisions made were optimal and resulted in a reduction of burden on the healthcare system. In
specific we consider using a synthetic control to construct alternative scenarios and understand what would have been the
effect on health if less stringent measures were adopted. We present analysis for The State of New York, United States, Italy
and The Indian capital city Delhi and show how lock-down measures has helped and what the counterfactual scenarios would
have been in comparison to the current state of affairs. We show that in The State of New York the number of deaths could
have been 6 times higher, and in Italy, the number of deaths could have been 3 times higher by 26th of June, 2020.
Introduction
In December 2019, an outbreak occurred in Wuhan, China involving a zoonotic coronavirus, similar to the SARS coronavirus
and MERS coronavirus1. The virus has been named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and
the disease caused by the virus has been named the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Since then the ongoing pandemic
has infected more than 9 million people and has caused more than 467 thousand deaths worldwide. Since the initial outbreak,
several different studies have tried to estimate the number of infections2 that stem from a single infected patient in order to
predict the potential for transmission of the COVID-19 virus. In most cases, it was seen that R0 > 1, implying exponential
growth through infection of a vulnerable population. Original estimates placed mortality rates for individuals at high risk at
4.46 % with those suffering from cardiovascular or kidney disease having even greater susceptibility3. The SARS-CoV-2 virus
has no available treatment as the pathways for proliferation and pathogenesis are still unclear4. Current treatments are based on
those effective on strains of the previous SARS coronavirus and MERS coronavirus. The SARS-CoV-2 virus is able to replicate
rapidly during the asymptomatic phase and affect the lungs and respiratory tract, resulting in pneumonia, hypoxia, and acute
respiratory distress5. Infected patients are directly dependent on external ventilation in most cases.
With the increasing pressure on the health systems due to reliance on intensive care units or non-invasive ventilation, health
strategies were required to be implemented. The concern was to ensure the number of infected patients does not exceed the
health system’s ability to cope with it. It also focused on increasing the capacities of available health systems at the time. Under
the conditions at the time, with a highly pathogenic SARS-CoV-2 that is able to spread asymptotically during its incubation
stage through a vulnerable population, policymakers were urged to contain the spread of the infection, and minimize stress on
the health systems and ensure public safety. This was done by issuing orders for widespread lock-down and implementing
social distancing measures. All non-essential businesses and services were shut down until further notice.
Taking measures to reduce stress on the health sector and diminishing the number of infected patients is important to end
the pandemic, and understanding the effectiveness of a lock-down enables the distinction of good safety measures from bad
ones. Analyzing effectiveness of control measures like lock-down allows us to understand whether the decisions made were
optimal and resulted in a reduction of burden on the healthcare system, and broke chain of transmission, preventing its spread
and reducing the reproductive rate of the virus. Any optimal policy considers a trade off between the benefit associated with
lock-down and cost of reduced aggregate output. Aggregate output decreases as a function of the stringency of the policy,
commitment from the government to maintain the level of stringency and adherence of general population. Aggregate output
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decreases through lower supply of labor, lower consumption and hence through lower investment, which results from investors’
expectation of a lower marginal product of capital. On the other hand benefit associated with lock-down can be seen through
the number of lives potentially saved and in curbing the pandemic early so that economic activity can be restarted early.
Our objective in this work is to understand the benefits obtained from stringency measures adopted by governments across
the world in terms of its health benefits. In the remaining of this section we describe our contribution and related works.
Subsequently in Section we provide a brief overview and mathematical underpinning of the tools that we use and describe our
data driven methodology and in Section we present our results in three different geographic setup. Finally, in Section we
present some concluding remarks.
Our contribution
In this work we consider stringency measures adopted by governments across the world and provide a counterfactual assessment
of the benefit from those measures in terms of health benefits. In order to estimate the counterfactual metric (say number of
deaths), we use a geographic location as a treatment unit (say Italy) and a set of other geographic locations as donor group (say
Brazil and United States). We take a data driven approach to construct a synthetic control6–8 using pre-intervention period
data (say from early February, 2020 to March 9, 2020) of the donor units and their linear combination, such that the squared
error between the estimated synthetic control and the treatment unit is minimized by the choice of weight parameters in this
pre-intervention time period. Now synthetic control can be extrapolated to estimate the metric. We use Multi-dimensional
Robust Synthetic Control (m-RSC) as a tool as described in8.
However, there are few difficulties in applying the tool as it is. Firstly, different governments adopted different levels of
stringency measures and there were different levels of compliance, and commitment. Secondly, there were no ‘pure‘ donor
groups as stringency measures were nearly ubiquitous. So we have used various secondary sources of data to score the level of
stringency measures , and level of compliance. This allowed us to determine donor groups relative to a choice of treatment unit.
Finally, we present our results in three different geographic setup - namely in the State of New York, Italy and Indian city of
Delhi, and analyze them.
Related Works
In9, authors have shown that the reproductive rate of the SARS-CoV-2 had significantly decreased after government intervention.
They show that the spread of disease was confined if measures were brought into effect early. In10, authors use the differential
timing of the introduction of stringency measures and changes in Google searches for unemployment claims to establish a
framework to estimate how each stringency measure contributes to unemployment. Authors show that early intervention efforts
in the form of non-essential business closure have contributed to less than 8.5 percent of unemployment claims.
Another facet to measure the success of the lock-down is to observe its effects on the health systems. Late intervention in
the case of Italy led to the flooding of hospitals and ICUs due to exponential spread. However, the national lock-down was
effective in reducing the proliferation and decreased the stress on the national health system as observed by authors in11. In
their paper12, authors extend the SIR model to include auxiliary state variables in the form of hospital capacity, contact with
an infected person, etc. They use a system dynamics model of the outbreak to simulate various lock-down scenarios with
recommendations for optimal strategy. In our work we consider the possible outcome if such strategies were not adopted, and
present counterfactual scenarios.
International travel has also been impacted as a result of efforts to reduce the spread of the coronavirus disease. On the basis
of reported cases, models built by13 show a significant decrease in the number of infections compared to predictions if no travel
bans were adopted as an option. Their modeling results indicate that travel restriction must be combined with a transmission
within the community to curb the spread.
Results
In this section we present three examples of the application of m-RSC to derive the counterfactual estimates of possible number
of deaths under the changed conditions like delaying or starting the stringency measures at earlier date. We consider three
different units of treatments, namely: The State of New York, Italy and The Indian capital city Delhi. In some sense these
places have also been termed as regional epicenters of the epidemic.
State of New York
New York has the highest number of confirmed cases in the United States. First case in New York was reported on 1st March,
2020 and New York went into a stricter lock-down on March 22nd, 2020. We estimate counterfactual considering this as date
of intervention. We select among other states from US as donor group using the methods described above. This includes New
Jersey, California, Illinois, and Florida among other states. By counterfactual estimate, the number of deaths in New York could
have been 6 times higher, and number of confirmed cases could have been 5 times higher.
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New York: Cumulative number of deaths over time and chainge points
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New York: Cumulative number of deaths, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Cumulative number of deaths)
Predictions (Cumulative number of deaths)
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New York: Cumulative number of confirmed cases, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Cumulative number of confirmed cases)
Predictions (Cumulative number of confirmed cases)
Figure 1. New York State: (a) Actual number of deaths with linear trend line and points where trend changed (b) Actual
number of deaths with counterfactual prediction estimated by m-RSC with actual lock-down date as intervention point (c)
Actual number of confirmed cases with counterfactual prediction estimated by m-RSC.
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Italy: Cumulative number of deaths over time and chainge points
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Italy: Cumulative number of deaths, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Cumulative number of deaths)
Predictions (Cumulative number of deaths)
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Italy: Cumulative number of confirmed cases, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Cumulative number of confirmed cases)
Predictions (Cumulative number of confirmed cases)
Figure 2. Italy: (a) Actual number of deaths with linear trend line and points where trend changed (b) Actual number of
deaths with counterfactual prediction estimated by m-RSC with actual lock-down date as intervention point (c) Actual number
of confirmed cases with counterfactual prediction estimated by m-RSC.
Italy
Italy was put under lock-down between 8th March, 2020 - 4th May, 2020. We considered most European countries to model the
donor group and selected based on criteria defined above. Based on our simulation, we observe that with lock-down measures
has been largely successful in Italy. Without such measures, the number of confirmed case could have been 8 times higher and
number of deaths could have been 3 times higher by 26th of June, 2020.
Delhi, India
India had one of the most strict stay home order across the country in first phase of the lock-down between 25 March 2020
– 14 April 2020 (21 days), where an entire population of 1.3 billion people was put under restricted movement. Overall the
lock-down had multiple phases, second phase was from 15th of April 2020 to 3rd of May 2020, and third phase was 4th of May
to 17th of May, 2020. We present the counterfactual for each of these dates. However, in this case we consider both the daily
number of confirmed cases as well as the cumulative number of confirmed cases for phase three of the lock-down. We limit the
donor group as all others states of India.
Figure 3 shows that counterfactual converges closely with the actual at third phase of the lock-down. It should be noted that
there are a few discrepancies in reporting. First, there is a weekly seasonality - possibly due to a lesser number of reports over
the weekends. Second due to a revised higher number of reports on certain dates (high peak).
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Delhi: Daily number of confirmed over time and chainge points
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Delhi: Daily number of confirmed cases, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Daily number of confirmed cases)
Predictions (Daily number of confirmed cases)
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Delhi: Daily number of confirmed cases, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Daily number of confirmed cases)
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Delhi: Cumulative number of confirmed cases, Actual and Counterfactual
Observations (Cumulative number of confirmed cases)
Predictions (Cumulative number of confirmed cases)
Figure 3. Delhi, India: (a) Actual number of confirmed cases with trend line and points where trend changed (b) Actual
number of confirmed cases with counterfactual prediction estimated by m-RSC with First lock-down date as intervention point
(c) On Second lock-down date (d) On third lock-down date
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Linear trend-line fit shows two change points in the growth of number of cases - indicating that the exponential phase came
at much later date and growth of the epidemic was under effective control in the earlier stages. Since, the stay-home order was
applicable across all states and adherence was almost uniform - trajectory of actual and counterfactual remains nearly same.
Discussion
In this work we use Multi-dimensional Robust Synthetic Control to understand the effects of stringency measure on COVID-19
pandemic. We construct synthetic version of a location using convex combination of other geographic locations in the donor
pool that most closely resembled the treatment unit in terms of pre-intervention period using stringency index and adherence
score (using mobility information). Results has been compared for The State of New York, Italy and Delhi, India with actual
metric to that of counterfactual predicted by the algorithm.
In order to assess the robustness of the predictor we have computed MAPE and MdAPE measures and have shown their
convergence to less than 20% absolute error rate. In the future we would like to include additional predictors like testing data,
and virus strain information as they become available. Another direction of this study is to include parametric epidemic models
like SIR-F19, and compare with m-RSC.
Methods
Tools
As stated above, our objective is to study the effects of government response at an aggregate level in terms of lives saved, and
limiting the number of cases that require hospitalization. Such interventions can effectively be studied at a comparative level.
In other words, if we have data for the evolution of aggregate outcomes, e.g. the number of confirmed cases and deaths, when
policy is applied in a group under study versus when the same policy is not applied in a control group. However, government
policies were applied at different level across a geographic region. We do not have a mechanism to conduct a randomized trial.
Hence, we consider using the synthetic control method6–8. In a synthetic control set up, where observational data is available
for different groups, we can construct a synthetic or virtual control group by combining measurements from alternatives (or
donors). In the following, we provide a brief overview of m-RSC8.
Suppose that observations from N different geographically distinct groups or units are indexed by i ∈ [N] in T time periods
(days) indexed by j ∈ [T ]. Let k ∈ [K] be the metrics of interest (e.g. number of confirmed cases, number of deceased, number
of tests conducted, etc.). By Mi jk we denote the ground-truth measurement of interest, and by Xi jk, an observation of this
measurement with some noise. Let 1≤ T0 ≤ T be the time instance in which our group of interest experiences an intervention,
namely a government response to control the spread (e.g. stay home order, school or business closure, or mass vaccination).
Without loss of generality we consider unit i= 1 (say, New York) and metric k = 1 (say, number of deaths) as our unit and
metric of interest respectively.
Our objective now is to estimate the trajectory of metric of interest k = 1 for unit i= 1 if no government response to control
the spread had occurred. In order to do that we will use the trajectory associated with the donor units (2≤ i≤ N ), and metrics
k ∈ [K]. In the following we make two assumptions: (1) for all 2≤ i≤ N, k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [T ], we have Xi jk =Mi jk+εi jk where,
εi jk is the observational noise, and (2) Same model is obeyed by i= 1 in pre–intervention period, i.e. for all j ∈ [T0] and k ∈ [K]
we have X1 jk =M1 jk+ ε1 jk. As described by authors in8, in following we also assume that for unit i= 1, we only observe the
measurement X1 jk for pre-intervention period, i.e. for all j ∈ [T0] and k ∈ [K]. Our objective is to compute a counterfactual
sequence of observation M1 jk for the time period j ∈ [T ], and k ∈ [K], and in specific for T0 ≤ j ≤ T , and k= 1, using synthetic
version of unit i= 1.
DefineM = [Mi jk] ∈ RN×T×K . M is assumed to have a few well behaved properties as required by the algorithm, namely,
(1)M must be approximately low-rank and (2) every element
∣∣Mi jk∣∣ shall have boundedness property (for details see8). To
check whether our model assumption holds in practice, we consider N = 185,T = 150,K = 2, with 185 countries as units. We
consider number of confirmed cases and number of deceased as two metrics over 150 days between January 22, 2020 and June
20, 2020. For assumption to hold, data matrix corresponding to number of confirmed cases and number of deceased and their
combination should be approximated by a low-rank matrix.
As shown in Figure 4, the spectrum of the top 20 singular values (sorted in descending order) for each matrix. The plots
clearly support the implications that most of the spectrum is concentrated within the top 5 principal components. The same
conclusion holds true when units are states of The United States, and when we consider only countries in The European Union.
Let Z ∈ R(N−1)×T×K corresponding to donor units, and X1 ∈ R1×T0×K correspond to unit under intervention. We obtain
Mˆ from Z after applying a hard singular value thresholding. Subsequently, weights are learned using linear regression by
computing
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Figure 4. The Singular Value spectrum for all countries (of dimensions 185×150, showing top 20 singular values, in
descending order.
βˆ = argmin
v∈R(N−1)
∥∥X1− vTMˆT0∥∥22
For every k ∈ [K], the corresponding estimated counterfactual means for the treatment unit is then defined as
Mˆ
(k)
1 = βˆ
TMˆ (k)
Measures of stringency and mobility
As described in Section , we use m-RSC to construct a synthetic control for the treatment unit using data from multiple control
units or donor group using pre-intervention period data. The synthetic control is then used for estimating the counterfactual
in the post-intervention period. In our setup, intervention date is typically the date when a stay-home order or lock-down
was declared for the treatment unit. However, government policy may have been applied over time with different levels of
stringency measures.
To understand this we use stringency and policy indices data from OxCGRT14, which records the strictness of policies that
restrict people’s behavior and includes 8 different measures - e.g. school and workplace closure, cancellation of public events,
restrictions on gathering size etc. Figure 5, shows the plot of stringency index, with mobility data.
It can be observed that the level of lock-down varies over time and geographic region. We use this information in two
different ways. First we choose the maximum level of index, first increased level of restriction index, and 14 days after the
maximum level of index as various intervention dates and compare their effects. Second, we combine this information with
mobility data to select the control groups for a treatment unit as discussed below.
In order to understand the effect of stringency on a treatment unit for a metric, we need to select a donor group where level
of stringency was different or adherence to stringency was different. Since, there was a degree of stringency and adherence to
such measures at different level - under any possible choice of donor group, we acknowledge, that we will be underestimating
the counterfactual - i.e. what would have been without any stringency measures. To estimate the degree of adherence to
lock-down measures, we use mobility data from Apple, Google and Facebook. Apple mobility data provides a relative volume
of directions requests per region, sub-region or city compared to a baseline volume - i.e. percentage change over time from the
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Figure 5. Stringency index, and Mobility Trends in (a) Italy (b) Germany (c) Sweden
baseline including weekly seasonality. Facebook data provides the relative percentage of population that is staying in the same
place and also the percentage of population that moved from a region to another. In Facebook data, to quantify how much
people move around measure is derived by counting the number of level-16 Bing tiles (which are approximately 600 meters
by 600 meters in area at the equator) they are seen in within a day. Assuming Ud,r is the set of eligible users in region r on
day d, and tiles(u) is the number of tiles visited by a given user u in Ud,r, total number of tiles visited for that region is given
by totaltiles(Ud,r) = ∑u∈Ud,r min(tiles(u),200). Change in Movement measure is then the difference between a baseline and
value on day d for average number of totaltiles(Ud,r). Similarly, Stay Put metric is calculated as the percentage of eligible
people who are only observed in a single level-16 Bing tile during the course of a day on an average compared to a baseline.
Finally, Google Community Mobility Report provides a percent change in visits to places like grocery stores and parks within a
geographic area from baseline.
It can be seen from Figure 5, that the adherence and stringency level do not correspond. For example, in Sweden, with
increasing level of government measures between March - April, there has not been any significant change in proportion of
people staying put or moving between regions. Similarly, in other places, it can be observed that while government measures
remain at the same level over April, number of people staying put at one place starts declining.
Selecting donor group: We combine metrics that allow the spread of the virus and similarly combine those that reduces the
possibility of spread. We combine them by taking average define a single adherence score. For unit i ∈ [N], ∀ j 6= i : j ∈ [N], j is
a donor unit if adherence score, and stringency Index of j is less than i. Figure 6 shows this relation in graphical form for a
selected set of countries. As per Figure 6, United States, Brazil and United Kingdom are in the donor group when we compute
counterfactual estimate for Italy.
Statistical Performance Evaluation: in Figure 7 we present the distribution of Mean and Median absolute percentage error
statistic for the runs-forecasts from m-RSC algorithm with changing forecast horizon. We consider every Mondays between
March 1, 2020 to June 21, 2020, both included to forecast the number of deaths at the end of the day on June 26, 2020 for
all states in United States, and compare with actual data. For every state, donor group is selected using the method described
above. It can be seen from Figure 7, that both Mean and Median absolute percentage error statistic are larger, when larger
forecast horizon has been considered, and that is to be expected. Both MAPE and MdAPE converge to a less than 20 percent
when horizon is about a week. MAPE being very large from MdAPE clearly indicates a right skew in the predicted values.
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Figure 6. Adherence score vs. Stringency index where size of each circle is determined by (a) total number of deaths till date
(b) total number of confirmed cases till date.
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Data source Description
Daily update from JHU15 We use this data to derive metric for units: i.e. number of confirmed
cases and number of deceased for each day and geographic locations.
Facebook Movement Range Maps16 The relative percentage of population that is staying put and also the
percentage of population that moved from a region to another. We use
this data in selection of donor units.
Apple Mobility Trends17 Relative volume of directions requests per region, sub-region or city
compared to a baseline volume, categorized by Driving, Walking or
Public Transport. We use this data in selection of donor units.
OxCGRT14 Strictness of policies that restrict people’s behavior, 8 measures com-
bined to provide a score between 0 and 100, where 100 being most
stringent. We use this data in selection of donor units.
Google Community Mobility Re-
port18
Percent change in visits to places like grocery stores and parks within
a geographic area. We use this data in selection of donor units.
Table 1. Data Source
This exactly corresponds to the places where exponential growth of the pandemic can be observed by March 22, 2020. The
counterfactual prediction for June 26, 2020 on March 22, 2020 for these few places are several times higher as as expected,
while, stricter stringency measures were being implemented in The United States around those dates.
Data Source
We use following five sources of data as described in Table 1:
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